L'objectivité journalistique d'un point de vue philosophique. Critique de l'argument constructiviste de la relativité conceputelle

Gilles Gauthier

Abstract


The chief, underlying philosophical argument for the impossibility of journalistic objectivity is the constructivist argument of conceptual relativity. Ontological constructivism is an antirealism placing that which does not exist in reality into representations; epistemic constructivism is an anti-objectivism which denies that a corresponding knowledge of reality is possible. Conceptual relativity is the idea wherein a state of affairs can be represented by various systems of representation. By resorting to Searle's criticism of the conceptual relativity as an anti-realistic argument, we demonstrate its invalidity as a derived antiobjectivist argument. An original counter-argument makes the demonstration of its invalidity an immediate anti-objectivist argument.  


Keywords


Objectivity; conceptual relativity; constructivism; antirealism; antiobjectivism

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Studies in Communication Sciences | ISSN: 1424-4896